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What's So Great About Lay Judgments?
What's So Bad About Expertise?
PROFESSOR STEPHEN GILLES*
It is a great responsibility to be carrying the torch for law
and economics. Unfortunately, not only am I not a trained
economist, but some of what I have to say will horrify many of
those who are. Economists too often want to stay within the
narrow confines of their discipline, conceived as a social sci-
entific enterprise that relentlessly tries to provide as thin and
value-neutral a set of starting points as possible. That is not
what this panel is or ought to be about, and it is not the kind
of economistic thinking that I will try to bring to bear on the
subject of risk. Let me start by defining the kinds of risk on
which I want to focus. Environmental law is concerned not
only with here-and-now risks to human health and safety,
but also with risks to remote future generations, to different
species, to nature, and to the biosphere. As fascinating as
those other sorts of risk are, I intend to say nothing about the
many issues of evaluation they present. Instead, I will adopt
the simplifying assumption that tort law and environmental
law are two overlapping modes of regulating risks to the
health and safety of human beings in our society, and confine
myself to that subset of risks.
What I want to talk about today is the widely perceived
and much discussed divergence between the way that laype-
ople evaluate risks and the way experts (such as cost-benefit
analysts, actuaries, and other risk analysts) evaluate them.'
I will begin by describing what appears to be cognitive com-
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac College School of Law. Thanks to Neal
Feigenson and Laurie Feldman for helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EF-
FECTIVE RISK REGULATION 33-39 (1993) [hereinafter BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIR-
CLE]; Clayton Gillette & James Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1027, 1070-99 (1990) [hereinafter Gillette & Krier]; Richard Pildes & Cass
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mon ground between these groups. Cognitive psychologists
have reported that both laypeople and experts often suffer
from cognitive biases of various kinds.2 One leading example
of such bias is "framing."3 The framing of a question about
risk will profoundly affect the answer that is given. If you
ask people to evaluate what is objectively the same set of
choices in two different ways, they will give you two different
answers depending on whether your phrasing highlights the
upside risk or the downside risk. Cognitive biases can also
take such forms as "availability:" risks that are familiar and
come readily to mind tend to get over-evaluated. 4 There are
also thresholds for risks. People tend, in general, to overesti-
mate the importance of low probability risks and underesti-
mate the importance of substantial, yet familiar, everyday
risks.
Now, there seems to be general agreement that each of
these cognitive biases is just that -a mistake, a distortion, a
failure to think rationally. 5 Although a good deal of law re-
view writing has discussed the public policy implications of
these types of cognitive errors, very little attention has been
paid to the question whether laypeople are significantly more
prone to such lapses than experts. The implicit assumption
in law review scholarship on these subjects seems to be that
laypeople and experts are equally susceptible to cognitive bi-
ases. 6 It would be interesting to explore whether this as-
sumption is really warranted by the cognitive psychology
literature.7 One would think, for example, that persons could
Sunstein, Reinventing The Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 43-94 (1995)
[hereinafter Pildes & Sunstein].
2. See Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive
Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747 (1990).
3. See PAUL SLOVIC ET AL., REGULATION OF RISK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PER-
SPECTIVE, IN REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 241, 250-56 (R. Noll
ed. 1985); Gillette & Krier, supra note 1, at 1092-93.
4. See Gillette and Krier, supra note 1, at 1091-92.
5. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 61 (these psychological tenden-
cies "can properly be viewed as cognitive errors").
6. See James E. Krier, Risk and Design, 19 J. LEGAL. STUD. 781 (1990);
Gillette & Krier, supra note 1, at 1093 & nn. 209-210, and sources cited therein.
7. For example, consider this statement from a leading cognitive psycholo-
gist: "'experts' judgments appear to be prone to many of the same biases as
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/2
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be trained to identify and guard against cognitive bias, and
that experts are more likely to receive that kind of training.8
Be that as it may, for present purposes I will assume that
experts and laypeople are equally prone to the sorts of clearly
erroneous cognitive bias above mentioned.
Given this assumption, cognitive bias cannot explain the
observed divergence between the risk assessments of layper-
sons and the risk assessments of experts. What then might
account for it? The prevailing view is that this divergence
traces to the presence in our society of two competing ver-
sions of rationality - one to which lay persons tend to sub-
scribe, and the other favored by most experts. For the typical
expert, "a death is a death."9 In contrast to the experts,
laypeople are said to have a more complex and context-sensi-
tive way of approaching risk evaluation. Laypeople, in evalu-
ating risks, give weight to considerations such as whether the
risk is "dreaded" or not; whether it is voluntarily assumed or
involuntarily imposed; whether it involves potentially cata-
strophic losses or minor ones; whether the losses are concen-
trated or dispersed, controllable or uncontrollable, familiar or
unfamiliar, distributively fair or unfair; and whether the risk
will adversely impact on future generations. This catalogue
is far from complete, but it contains many of the issues that
are said to influence lay evaluation of risk.1° By which of
these competing visions of rationality should public policy be
guided? And by what criteria shall we answer that question?
Justice Breyer has called for giving experts greater authority
in matters of risk regulation, on the grounds that we would
those of the general public, particularly when experts are forced to go beyond
the limits of available data and rely on intuition." Paul Slovic, PERCEPTION OF
RISK, 236 Sci. 280, 281 (1983). This statement is consistent with equal suscep-
tibility, but also with very unequal susceptibility. Moreover, in some contexts
part of what distinguishes experts from laypeople would seem to be that the
former have better data and hence need not rely as much on intuition.
8. Or people might gradually learn from experience to guard against these
errors - and one would expect experts to have more experience with risk assess-
ment than lay persons.
9. See Gillette and Krier, supra note 1, at 1072; Pildes & Sunstein, supra
note 1, at 49-50.
10. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 57, and sources cited therein.
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get more safety for less money." The more popular view-
point among legal academics, however, seems to be the one
expressed by Clayton Gillette and James Krier, and more re-
cently by Cass Sunstein and Richard Pildes: lay perspectives
on risk are often richer, more nuanced, and more contextual
than those of experts, and should be given considerable
weight both as a matter of democratic values and as a matter
of reaching the right level of regulation.12 Gillette and Krier
note that the resolution of which perspective is better is a
matter of ethics and politics, not technical expertise, and they
argue that lay judgments frequently make good ethical
sense. 13 Pildes & Sunstein suggest that public risk regula-
tion should often incorporate the distinctive rationality pres-
ent in lay thinking about risk.14 The layperson's rationality
is one that rejects some conventional forms of cost-benefits
balancing - and, say these authors for the most part justifia-
bly so.
My thesis is that there is more to be said in favor of the
expert perspective than even Justice Breyer recognizes, and
that the problems with lay judgments are far more serious
and potentially costly than scholars such as Gillette and
Krier or Pildes and Sunstein have acknowledged. In an im-
portant recent book, Howard Margolis argues that many of
the reasons lay people give for their supposedly rich and
value-laden risk assessments are really rationalizations for
what is actually a defensive, close-minded, better-safe-than-
sorry stance toward certain risks.' 5 Building on some of Mar-
golis's insights, I will suggest that there are, in many con-
texts, serious flaws in the use of the factors on which
laypeople rely.
In making this argument, I intend to bear in mind the
economic understanding of rationality, but I will not restrict
11. See BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE, supra note 1, at 59-63.
12. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 1, at 1070-85; Pildes & Sunstein, supra
note 1, at 55-64.
13. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 1, at 1071-73.
14. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 8.
15. HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND THE Ex-
PERTS DISAGREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1996) [hereinafter DEALING WITH
RISK].
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myself to a supposedly neutral, scientific, rigorous definition
of rationality that excludes most of what we normally do
when we think and reason. Instead, like Gillette and Krier,
and Pildes and Sunstein, I will appeal to our common intu-
itions concerning reasonableness without trying to give a
foundational account of rationality. I will assume that we
give weight to consequences, but not that we are thoroughgo-
ing utilitarians; that we give weight to our convictions about
right and wrong, but not that we are thoroughgoing deontolo-
gists; that we care about both private flourishing and public
good, but not that we are thoroughgoing political liberals. My
goal, in short, is to present a set of judgments about concrete
examples in ways that a wide audience might find both intel-
ligible and appealing. The common thread running through
those judgments will be that, in many contexts, the consider-
ations on which laypersons tend to rely are difficult to defend
in pragmatic or ethical terms. This in turn suggests that the
lay version of rationality may not be all that "reasonable." In
other words, I want to engage directly on the point in contro-
versy, namely which of these visions of rationality is more
reasonable, and to suggest that, all things considered, the ex-
pert approach is preferable.
I have chosen several of my examples precisely because
they have been used by others to illustrate the virtues of lay
rationality - yet they seem to me to illustrate its pitfalls.
Before turning to my examples, let me make two preliminary
points. First, there is something appealingly egalitarian
about the expert (which often means, the cost-benefit) version
of rationality. The charge of elitism, sometimes thrown at
people like Justice Breyer, is ironic in light of the egalitarian
implications of the economic way of evaluating risks. For in-
stance, when you say "a death is a death," you rule out raw
political judgments such as that an African American's death
is not as important as a Caucasian's death.
Second, I readily will concede that experts are sometimes
wrong, obtuse, bureaucratic, and so on. But to this acknowl-
edgement I want to join the assertion that one of the virtues
of the expert perspective is its perfectibility, its openness to
revision and incremental improvement in the pragmatic tra-
1997] 503
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dition of the social sciences. As I've already mentioned, some
risk analysts have been criticized for treating all statistical
deaths as equivalent. The public fears death by cancer more
than instant death. Experts of this persuasion seem to me
wrong here for reasons that as experts (i.e., as social scien-
tists) their own principles should compel them to concede.
Obviously pain and suffering have negative value/utility, and
cancer deaths are associated with lots of pain and suffering
(psychological as well as physical). So here is an expert prac-
tice that is wrong, but readily correctable within the frame-
work of cost-benefit analysis.
Now to my list of examples. The first, from Gillette and
Krier, involves two pesticides. 16 The problem is the choice of
which to use. Pesticide "A" will cause ten excess cancers per
year. There is a 95% chance that Pesticide "B" will cause no
excess cancers, and a 5% chance that it will cause one hun-
dred excess cancers per year. On average, then, pesticide "B"
results in five cancers per year while pesticide "A" results in
ten. Gillette and Krier argue that it is perfectly reasonable to
choose pesticide "A" even though its use results in ten cancers
per year, because if 100 people died, there would be a special
"regret" about having made a choice that led to a much larger
number of deaths. 17 This seems very dubious as a moral mat-
ter. We would be allowing our fear of regret, our fear that we
might discover in hindsight that we made a bad mistake, to
cause us to make a decision now, ex ante, that is likely to lead
to the death of ten people instead of five. What is so reason-
able about giving decisive weight to our own possible future
discomfort as against other people's lives?
Example two involves the choice of whether to fly or to
drive when travelling. In this example, we do not have a di-
rect regulatory question, although one might surface with re-
gard to things like child seats on airplanes. Flying is as
voluntary an activity as driving, but many people perceive
flying as more dangerous even though driving is, statistically
16. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 1, at 1083-84.
17. See id. at 1084.
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speaking, much more dangerous. Why is this? And does this
perception deserve to be called rational?
The reason cannot be "catastrophic losses," because
planes do not wipe out entire towns - occasional rock bands,
but not entire towns. Rather, I suspect the decisive factor is
our perceived lack of control over the risk. When a person is
a passenger in an airplane, he or she is helpless as against
the risks of turbulence, crashing, fire and so on - and that
helplessness is stressful no matter what the statistics say.
But it does not follow that the judgment to which this stress
inclines us is rational. Indeed, I take one message of the cog-
nitive psychology literature to be that people tend to be overly
confident about the extent of their control, about the reliabil-
ity of their cognitive powers, and even (I surmise) about their
reflexes. Control is the mother of optimism: it makes us
think we are safe when we are driving (even though, in fact,
we have no control over many driving-related risks). But, on
average, we are wrong. Flying really is safer, and our percep-
tion to the contrary is merely a persistent illusion.
My third example is from Pildes and Sunstein. They con-
tend that society might rationally reject the ignition inter-
lock, a mechanism that automatically disables cars from
starting unless (at a minimum) the driver's seat belt is buck-
led.' Instead, society could reasonably prefer other regula-
tions that do not interfere so pervasively with an individual's
choice, even if the ignition interlock would be more effective
from the standpoint of cost per lives saved. But if we are
truly confident that the ignition interlock will save signifi-
cantly more lives because far more seat belts will be worn,
the case against deferring to individual choices seems very
strong.
First, the ignition interlock does not seem like such a big
infringement on individual choice. Why can't we look at this
as a pre-commitment strategy in which we all know we are
going to have moments of weakness? Pildes and Sunstein
might answer that although people may have bad safety hab-
its, part of our self-conception is that we should be the ones to
18. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 51-52.
1997] 505
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change them, not the government. To this I would reply (us-
ing ideas Pildes and Sunstein themselves invoke) that it
would be much more rational for society to decide to create a
new norm in hopes of changing the social meaning of getting
in your car, and in order to assist the people who would like
to change their bad habits but have difficulty doing so.
Let me also mention a variation on this example. As-
sume a more ambitious version of ignition interlocks that will
not allow the engine to be turned on until every passenger in
the car is wearing a seatbelt. Now we are talking about sav-
ing kids from parents who might not have sense enough to
strap them in. Consider, too, the situation of teenage drivers
- a group we would predict to be at the low end of the scale
in terms of seatbelt use. Finally, recall the externalities that
even adult drivers create when they are injured or killed and
(as is often the case) the public foots all or part of the bill. For
all these reasons, the lay judgment against ignition inter-
locks seems, if not quite nonsensical, very difficult to defend.
Example four has to do with disasters: specifically, the
Buffalo Creek Syndrome, named after the Buffalo Creek dam
collapsel 9 in which 125 people were killed and 4000 people
rendered homeless, triggering great psychological trauma to
the survivors. 20 Whole families were wiped out, relationships
were destroyed, and the community that had provided the
topographical basis for those relationships was obliterated.
Some economists or other experts may have said, "well it is
just 120 lives." But perceptive experts wouldn't make this
mistake, because in addition to the 120 lost lives there is un-
deniably major harm to at least 4000 people who are now
homeless and community-less, with all that entails. Here is
another example where the solution may be a more careful
and nuanced cost-benefit analysis.
Now, consider the potential problem posed by a categori-
cal lay judgment that avoiding a disaster like Buffalo Creek
should be a higher priority than avoiding larger but less con-
19. See TOM NUGENT, DEATH AT BUFFALO CREEK (1973). See also Pildes &
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 61-62.
20. See TOM NUGENT, DEATH AT BUFFALO CREEK 62 (1973).
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centrated risks. Suppose the risk of another disaster like
Buffalo Creek were compared with the risk of 4,120 deaths
spread diffusely across the entire country. At that point, I do
not think that a judgment that gave greater weight to the
possibility of a concentrated loss would be very easy to de-
fend. To do so would be to suggest that the harm inflicted
upon each of the traumatized Buffalo Creek survivors is
greater than the harm inflicted upon each of those who died.
Yet few of us would choose death over psychological trauma.
What then would be gained by incorporating a lay view of
this kind into public risk analysis?
Example five, from Justice Breyer, is asbestos removal
from schools. I assume Breyer has the facts right. The mid-
point estimate to take all the asbestos out of all the schools is
a cost of $100 billion - that looks like several hundred mil-
lion dollars per cancer avoided. 21 Breyer says that is not a
sensible evaluation. Some laypeople, one suspects, would
criticize him for overlooking the fact that asbestos is dreaded.
Indeed it is dreaded, but a couple of points must be made.
Juvenile diabetes is dreaded by anyone who is familiar with
it. Leukemia in children is dreaded. Sickle cell anemia is
dreaded. The core economic insight of opportunity cost has
an appropriate role to play here: there is a broad range of
dreaded risks, and some of them can be reduced at far lower
cost than others. If the same $100 billion were spent on re-
ducing more tractable risks to children's health and safety,
we could save far more statistical lives - that is, far more
children. Why is it defensible to let dread drive us to spend
huge sums to save some small number of unknown school
children, when for the same money we could be shielding
many more children from no less dreadful risks?
Example six takes me back to Professor Shapo's discus-
sion of Yucca mountain and the more general topic of contro-
versies over the siting of storage facilities for nuclear waste.
Margolis offers a fascinating treatment of these situations.
But let me start with what I think Pildes and Sunstein would
say: that in many of these siting disputes, the Department of
21. See BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE, supra note 1, at 12-14.
1997] 507
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Energy (DOE) has been obtuse.22 It has inflamed people's
distrust. The DOE treated people's concerns as being the re-
sult of irrationality and ignorance, leading to a self-fulfilling
result in which people lost their trust in the agency. The
agency, in turn, lost its credibility and the situation is now
very hard to repair.
This is a valid and important point. Politics is a con-
straint. Even if you think that as an expert you know better,
you would be foolish to treat people disrespectfully rather
than doing your best to try to persuade them that you are
right. Here is where Margolis's analysis comes in. It is not so
easy to persuade people in these circumstances. In some con-
texts, and Margolis says this is emphatically one of them,
people get locked into what he calls a "better-safe-than-sorry"
frame of mind, in which the risk is very salient and "on
screen" while the costs of doing something about the risks are
"off screen." In that frame of mind, Margolis suggests, people
often are not amenable to argument or persuasion. 23 The
risk is seen as something "everybody knows" is real - that is,
serious. Yet, along comes an expert trying to tell them that it
is not real - that is, trivial. In those contexts, Margolis sug-
gests that, as an empirical matter, lay people often get angry
instead of engaging in an open-minded evaluation of the evi-
dence. They do not want to hear evidence or argument that
would force them to rethink their settled (and, in a sense,
their collective) judgment.
How, then, might this resistance be overcome, so that lay
people become amenable to discussion and persuasion by ex-
perts? Margolis suggests that when people face actual, con-
crete, immediate costs, they will reevaluate. 24 He offers the
example of asbestos removal in the New York City schools.
Parents were up in arms, saying things like "get the asbestos
out of our schools," until school officials actually closed the
schools so they could be inspected to locate where all the as-
bestos was located. At that point parents suddenly had to
22. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 91-92.
23. See DEALING wrrH RISK, supra note 15, at 121-24.
24. See id. at 124-28.
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deal with kids staying home, disruption of the parents' work-
ing lives, risks to children playing out in the streets, etc. As
Margolis tells it, people did a 180 degree flip, along the lines
of, "forget about asbestos, open up the schools." This does not
prove, of course, that people were right the second time. But
to an economist, the telling fact is that parents changed their
minds once some of the costs of removing asbestos fell on
them. It suggests, I think, a connection between the "better-
safe-than-sorry" mode and situations where lay people frame
the decision in terms of how much the persons responsible for
creating or dealing with the risk should have to do to elimi-
nate it. Economists would not find it surprising that people
will err wildly in the direction of too much safety when they
think they are spending somebody else's money.
Margolis believes the same better-safe-than-sorry phe-
nomenon is a major factor in the dispute over storage of nu-
clear waste. His claim (which I have not factually
investigated myself) is that, in many siting disputes, the peo-
ple at the immediate locale who are going to get the benefits
of the jobs, economy and the like, are open to persuasion. 25
They typically conclude that the risks from having the stor-
age facility in their backyards are tolerable, and are worth
going ahead with the project. Not everybody - but the local
majority - tends to adopt this view. Who then are the people
whose intense opposition succeeds in delaying or derailing
these projects? They are the people who live in the same
state, but not immediately around the site, who are not going
to be getting the jobs and the benefits, but who might be ex-
posed to some of the risks if there is a leak. When you have
radioactive waste coming in by rail through Santa Fe, people
in Santa Fe become upset. People in Carlsbad, in the imme-
diate vicinity of the planned site, will go for it. Margolis calls
this "the 'volcano' effect, where concern is highest in periph-
eral locations, not in the immediate vicinity of a risk."26
Now, isn't there a problem here from both a democratic
and ethical standpoint? Perhaps Professor Shapo is right
25. See id. at 137-40.
26. See id. at 140.
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that there are intractable difficulties in determining just how
safe is safe enough, whether at Yucca mountain or any other
site for nuclear waste storage. But as Gregg Easterbrook ar-
gues, it is far safer to store these wastes in remote under-
ground sites than to have them sitting on the premises of
nuclear plants in scores of metropolitan areas throughout the
country.27 We may never know what "safe" is, but we do
know that it is "safer" to get the waste out of urban areas.
Thus, we seem to have a situation in which the Nation is sub-
stantially better off because the urban risk is being elimi-
nated, the local people most affected by the residual risk are
better off because well-compensated for bearing it, and yet
the process is hijacked by persons elsewhere in the state, who
are bearing extremely small risks but who are locked in the
"better-safe-than-sorry" mode because they are not capturing
any of the benefits. Is that how democratic risk evaluation is
supposed to work?
My final example, also from Margolis, concerns
saccharin. We are all familiar with the warning on products
- including, at one time, most diet sodas - that contain
saccharin: "Warning: this product contains saccharin, which
has been determined to cause cancer in laboratory animals."
Most of us know that the rats in those studies were given
massive, not quite lethal doses of saccharin, equivalent to
something like 800 cans of soda per day for an adult
human. 28 These studies are beset by serious questions about
cross-species inferences, about the assumption that effects
can be extrapolated as if they were linear, and so forth. But
those questions are just the tip of the iceberg. According to
Margolis, the same studies indicated that rats given smaller
doses of saccharin, equivalent to more like eight cans of soda
per day for a human, showed lower levels of tumors than the
control group.29 On the same assumptions about cross-spe-
cies validity and dose-responsiveness, then, the diet soda
"warning" ought to say that saccharin has been determined to
27. See GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH: THE COMING AGE
OF ENVIRONMENTAL OPTIMISM 513-18 (1995).
28. See DEALING WITH RISK, supra note 15, at 170.
29. See id. at 183-85.
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prevent cancer in laboratory animals. (This would have been
welcome news to one of my former co-clerks, who religiously
drank at least eight cans of Tab per day in the face of the
actual warning.) Perhaps it would be possible to construct
meta-hypotheses to justify even the weirdly inconsistent eval-
uation of risks and benefits that underlies the saccharin
warning. But any such attempts seem utterly speculative.
And yet, lay judgment is not in any simple sense the vil-
lain in the saccharin story. As Margolis points out, in the end
it was laypeople - with their mundane concerns about being
able (thanks to diet soda) to eat more, lose weight, or both -
who prevented a ban on saccharin. 30 It was the experts
(more precisely, the government's experts) who chose to skew
their analysis by looking only at the possible cancer risk from
consuming saccharin, while ignoring the cancers and heart
attacks that would be avoided by saccharin-associated weight
loss. 31 So, saccharin also seems to be another example where,
once laypeople faced the imminent costs of a saccharin ban,
their judgments turned out to be reasonable.
What do these examples add up to? In closing, I will
briefly suggest two conclusions. First, these examples sug-
gest that lay judgments about risk are often flawed - under-
standable, yes; reasonable, no. In my judgment, the
proponents of reliance on lay judgments have yet to come up
with robust, concrete examples of how doing so would make
for better risk evaluation. Second, the dichotomy between lay
risk assessment and expert risk assessment should not be
overdrawn. Lay people may look to a variety of considera-
tions in evaluating risks, but at the end of the day costs and
benefits seem quite salient in lay thinking - provided that
the people in question are aware that they bear those costs and
benefits. This leads me to a conclusion I think most econo-
mists, no matter how put off by anything else I have said,
would strongly endorse: decision-makers, whether they are
lay people or experts in risk assessment, tend to think least
clearly when somebody else is paying for the precautions they
30. See id. at 172-73.
31. See id. at 177-78.
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are empowered to choose. If we want better decisions about
risk, we must find ways to give decision-makers (lay or ex-
pert) better incentives to evaluate reasonably.
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/2
